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Hypercapitalism: Political economy, electric identity, and authorial alienation 
Abstract 
Hypercapitalism, with its "knowledge economy", is the form of capitalism under which thought itself is 
produced, commodified, and exchanged within the globally integrated system of communication 
technologies. As such, hypercapitalism may be seen as not so much a revolution, but rather an evolution: 
the progressively thorough, inexorable totalisation of social relations by Capital. The study on which this 
paper is based synthesises the sociological perspectives of Marx (1970, 1844/1975, 1846/1972, 1976, 1978, 
1981) and Adorno (1951/1974, 1991; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/1998), and the Critical Discourse 
perspectives of Fairclough (1989, 1992) and Lemke (1995) to argue that alienated thought and language are 
the fundamental, irreducible commodity-forms of Cybersociety’s knowledge economy.  
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Introduction 
Historically speaking, innovations in communication technologies have invariably coincided with 
ruptures in social relations. This is neither a new nor a surprising statement. That communication 
technologies and social relations have mutually determinative and constraining effects upon each other is 
also axiomatic. What is surprising about the age we are living through is the apparent amazement with 
which theorists and researchers, from many disciplines, view the effects that advances in information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) are having on our societies and our economies.  
Communication technologies, from the written word onward, have played consistent roles 
throughout human history: the preservation of knowledge, the creation of knowledge monopolies, the 
maintenance and expansion of centralised power, and the eventual demise of these (cf. Innis, 1951). The 
role that ICTs play today is no different. Thus we see, rebadged in the most up-to-date technical jargon, the 
continuation of these historically persistent phenomena. In other words, Cybersociety is only as real as the 
ideological language used to describe it, and is only as new as its technologically determined form. This is 
not meant to imply either a nominalis t or a technological determinist perspective. Just as various Gods exist 
- nominally for some; not at all for others; and as deities whose existences are irrefutable, determining 
realities for the rest - the Cybersociety we are here to explore exists more as a faith than a provable reality. 
Each communication technology, like each faith, has its historically unique form and content, but their 
intended purposes remain consistent, persistent, and predictable throughout history: that of social control. 
Their actual, world-historical consequences are an entirely different matter. 
If Cybersociety is the form of society that has ICTs as its main medium of communication, then it 
is definitively exclusive: less than one-tenth of one percent of the world’s population owns a computer 
(Irving, 1998). If, on the other hand, we were to include the massive infrastructure of the ‘culture industry’ 
in this society, then we must include people in the most remote parts of the earth who are exposed to the 
industry’s products. Neither of these approaches is satisfactory to my mind. The propagated faith in 
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Cybersociety is a purely proprietary concern, a mostly illusory and fragmented phenomenon given apparent 
coherence by the willingness of people to see continuity where none exis ts. But for the purposes of this 
paper, let us concede that a Cybersociety does exist. Further, let us consider that the Cybersociety can be, at 
least  partially, defined by the way the people who constitute it make their living: Cybersociety’s relations 
of production. 
Speculation, communication technologies, and the illusion of value 
To examine the way the relations of production are organised in Cybersociety, we must first look 
at how its commodities are produced. These are, simply, knowledge commodities. Knowledge commodities 
are products of valorised dialects and valorised communities (Graham, 1999). The most valuable of these 
are produced by scientists, mathematicians, economists, business administrators, politicians, technologists, 
and so on (Graham, 1999). Valorised forms of thought depend on expert, valorised dialects. But despite 
their dependence on these dialects, knowledge commodities can in no way be regarded as immaterial or 
non-material. Dialects of power provide ‘access to material resources’ and are, unquestionably, materially 
produced, ‘socially embedded’ practices (Gal, 1989, p. 352). They also have a specific function in society 
(Martin, 1998). In being produced and exchanged, the products of valorised dialects - like the material 
products of industrialised society - produce and reproduce specific, though not immutable, social relations 
(Fairclough, 1989, 1992; Lemke, 1995, chapt. 4; Graham, 1999). In short, knowledge commodities have a 
fully fungible relationship with the language by which they are exchanged, and, more significantly, with 
money –the illusory and mysterious system of exchange value which renders all things rational, 
measurable, and equivalent (cf. Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/1998, pp. 10-17; Marx, 1844/1975, 1970, 
1976, 1978, 1980).  
The illusory system of monetary value is, quite naturally, Cybersociety’s organising principle. Its 
hypercapitalist knowledge economy is fuelled almost entirely by speculation (cf. Graham, 1998; Graham, 
1999; Saul, 1997; Thurow, 1996). That is not a contentious statement. It is also not surprising. The first 
major activities that new communication technologies tend to promote are hucksterism, hyperbole, 
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speculation, and outright swindles. This has been especially so since the telegraph, when communication 
between places first became immediate:  
The hype, skepticism and bewilderment associated with the internet … concerns about 
new forms of crime, adjustment in social mores, and redefinition of business practices … 
mirror precisely the hopes, fears and misunderstandings inspired by the telegraph 
(Standage, 1998, p. 3).  
The speculative confusions surrounding the telegraph are historically sandwiched by similar 
phenomena that appear to be concomitant with advances in communication technology, including transport:  
In the 1850s, the railroad was widely expected to greatly increase the efficiency of 
communications and commerce. It did, but not enough to justify the prices of railroad 
stocks which grew to enormous speculative heights before collapsing on 24 August 1857. 
Radio in the 1920s also promised to create a revolution in the economics of 
communications and commerce. Indeed, an entirely new industry grew out of the 
invention. Euphoria over the promising new technology came to an abrupt end in October 
1929. Even stock in RCA, the only company that had successfully built a profitable 
business from radio, lost 97% of its value between 1929 and 1933 (iTulip, 1999).  
Speculation, communication, electricity, and news joined forces in the person of Julius Reuter 
(1816-990). Reuter thought that telegraphy would transform the meaning of news (Hobsbawm, 1975, p. 
77). It did. Significantly, the infrastructure for global currency trade and general financial speculation is 
today owned (and naturally promoted) by the Reuters news organisation. Thus, its is no surprise that the 
most prolific, popularised, and valorised sector of the knowledge economy is the trade in currency, and 
even moreso in sophisticated forms of debt.  
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Ongoing, serial collapses of whole economies can be directly attributed to financial speculation 
and manufactured illusions of wealth, mostly in the form of debt in its manifold, abstracted forms (cf. Saul, 
1997; Graham, 1999; Hellyer, 1999). The most recent collapses in East Asia, South America, and Eastern 
Europe are all the result of speculative excesses compounded by hyperinflated currency markets and the 
tendency of the financial sector to conjure abstraction upon abstraction, dub these “new products”, and send 
them into circulation at the speed of light (Graham, 1998, 1999).  
The most abstract of these new financial products are credit derivatives. Put as simply as possible, 
credit derivatives are a form of insurance on notional capital which is raised against the possibilities of 
future commodities coming into existence. They are hard for people ‘without a Nobel Prize in 
mathematics’ to understand (Kohler, 1998). Nevertheless, trade in these pure abstractions generated $US 
20 billion dollars in 1996, twice as much in 1997, and is expected to exceed $US 100 billion per year by 
2001 (Edwardes, 1998a). Credit derivatives exemplify the commodity-forms of thought that sustain the 
knowledge economy, and the valorised social relations within which they are produced. The relations of 
production in Cybersociety are relations of abstraction, expertise, and valorised illusions. 
The mass production and propagation of ideology  
The monetary exchange system is as powerful a force for social organisation as language itself. Its 
organising logic is ultimately hypnotic and numbing. With a minimum of slippage, one might easily be 
fooled into thinking that money is a language of its own. But a mass-produced system of qualitatively 
homogenous promises - however expedient - can only be analysed in terms of itself. Thus, the monetary 
system of exchange-value easily insinuates itself everywhere, precisely because of its impenetrable, 
circular logic. Simultaneously, it obscures itself from its source: human imagination. Once sufficiently 
obscured, it takes up a trajectory that appears to be objective and independent of people, history, and 
circumstances. In this system, ‘anything that is not reified, cannot be counted and measured, ceases to 
exist’ (Adorno, 1951/1974, p. 47). As such, under hypercapitalism, this system has reached its apotheosis 
because, as in religion,  
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the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of 
their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it 
is in the world of commodities … I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the 
products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is therefore 
inseparable from the production of commodities (Marx, 1976, p. 165). 
Marx’s intended analogy precisely describes hypercapitalist fetishisms. They attach themselves to valorised 
categories of thought and language, the irreducible commodity-forms produced by the “knowledge 
 
The immediacy of hypercapitalist exchange facilitates the most extraordinary phenomena, not the 
least of which is the mass propagation of speculative ideology. The information age is more about 
speculation than emancipation. Less than 0.1 percent of people own a computer (Irving, 1998), and less 
than 400 of the world’s richest people own more than the poorest 2.3 billion (Bauman, 1998). Of the small 
percentage of humanity who do have access to the internet, less than 5 percent of these use it for 
commercial purposes (OECD, 1998a,b,c; NOIE, 1998). Despite this, the bulk of international trade, by 
value, is carried on within the realm of the internets. It constitutes more than 100 times the amount of trade 
carried on within the physical realm (Graham, 1998; OECD, 1998a,b,c; Saul, 1997; Thurow, 1996). In 
reality, the advantages of new communication technologies advance the interests of the ‘one class … which 
enjoys world citizenship –the international investor’ (Griffin Cohen, in Barker, 1998).  
The electronic impostor: trading Trojan horses  
At first glance, the most pervasive of hypercapitalism’s emergent technologies, ICTs, appear to be 
similar in nature to preceding technologies, like those of the well-developed culture industries. But this is 
not the case. While there is much talk about the apparent immutability of “convergence” among electronic 
media, and that other media will be swallowed by the interactive interface of the multimodal internet, this is 
highly unlikely, regardless of whether the infrastructure becomes available to support such an eventuality. 
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The internet is a new medium, with all the confusions any new medium engenders. Its success and 
acceptance depends on established forms of media.  
Emerging media need older, established media to announce, valorise, and legitimise them. ICTs 
need new magazines to promote them; new policies to cope with their unpredictable nature; news stories to 
announce each new advance in their development; hyperbolic industry advertising; television appearances; 
mass-mediated product launches, and so on. The similarity in their nature with those of previous media is 
that - like all previous electronic media developments - their physical infrastructure is centrally owned, and 
their most useful and powerful content is the property of proprietary interests. In short, the internet provides 
global capital with the means to create specialised knowledge monopolies. Enlightenment seems intent 
upon manifesting itself in a new Dark Age.  
The distinct forms of Cybersociety’s prevalent media should not be confused with each other. 
Each is a distinctly separate phenomenon with distinctly different social effects. Despite their digital 
commonality, and the hyperbole about “convergence”, they have no more in common than the radio and 
the compact disc. Both the internet and the culture industries are propietary weapons, each of which has 
separate functions for their controlling interests. The culture industry promotes its child, the internet. But 
the child and parent, though they resemble each other in certain ways, are not at all the same. The internet, 
apparently unbeknown to the culture industry, is also the bastard child of the enlightened military.  
The internet feigns interactivity, an ostensibly social phenomenon, but it is intrinsically 
individualising, repressive, and self-valorising. It apes the extension of the whole human consciousness, but 
it is merely an extension of the authoritarian grasp and gaze extended into the most intimate aspects of its 
users’ consciousness. At its most “productive”, the internet shines upon the inner relationship between 
individual desire, decision, and action. It exposes these most personal processes in a system of numerically 
ordered profiles, perfected for marketing. In marketing terms, these profiles constitute the consumer’s ‘total 
ternet remains mostly hidden, although its grotesque parents, 
the culture industries and the complex of military industrial technologies, deny that it is one of them. This, 
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too, ought to give us some clue as to the nature of the phenomena under discussion. The fact that the 
culture industy spends so much promoting something which - according to it - challenges the future of the 
industry, ought to raise concern.  
The internet’s pedigree is ideologically pure: it is pure blue-blood, the ruling class mentality 
realised in a network of trivialised, valorised, and fetishised technologies. Not surprisingly, its propaganda 
favours hypercapitalism and the information economy, because  
[t]he ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is 
the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The 
class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same 
time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas 
of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it (Marx, 1846/1972, p. 
136). 
In the knowledge economy, the culture industries have come into their inevitable inheritance. 
What was once a dependent relationship has been inverted. In 1944,  
the objective social tendency is incarnate in the hidden subjective purposes of company 
directors, the foremost among whom are in the most powerful sectors of industry –steel, 
petroleum, electricity, and chemicals. Culture monopolies are weak and dependent in 
comparison (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/1998, p. 122). 
But today, in times of trouble, the president of the United States is more likely to call a sitcom producer 
than a steel magnate or a lawyer (McFeatters, 1998). Today, the total value of the entire South Korea Stock 
Exchange is now precisely half that of the stock value of the Disney Corporation (Walker, 1999). This 
should not promote the fallacy that capital requires a homogenous or unifying ideology other than that of 
the literate mind sensitised and socialised to profit and competition as decisive values. The commodities of 
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hypercapitalism draw strength from their adaptive ideological diversity. Social and ideological 
fragmentation makes the business of commodifying social intimacies all the more easy. Indeed, ‘[t]he 
genius of capitalism is its simplicity of motive. As long as profit can be accumulated, other considerations 
are secondary’ (Tetzlaff, 1991). Written literacy allows an ostensible split between the thought and the 
thinker, and the the exchange system of money allows an ostensible split between the product and its value. 
Because Cybersociety’s knowledge economy operationalises both these illusions at once, knowledge 
commodities can be seen as the ultimate consumer good: pure, immediate, self-valorising value. 
Ideology, idealism, and social identity 
With its profit-oriented value system, hypercapitalism has naturally become the source of all 
subjective identity formation, precisely because of its all-encompassing logic and its ideologically adaptive 
poducts. Like a mirror image, the emerging media are Zen-like paradoxes. Just as our reflections do not 
exist unless we stand with our eyes fixed upon ourselves, the ostensibly public space of the internet is only 
realised in the privacy of direct individual interaction with its content. The virtual space of Cybersociety 
occupies the same virtual space as More’s Utopia. These spaces are realised in precisely the same way. 
Both are the fictitious illusions of print media. The reader, confounded and numbed by the paradox of 
cognitive alienation, closes the circle of description that the author of individual experience opens by 
separating thought from thinker.  
The resources of self-identity are, as always, fundamentally social, descriptive, and linguistic:  
in the network of linguistic interactions in which we move, we maintain an ongoing 
descriptive recursion which we call the “I”. It enables us to conserve our linguistic 
operational coherence and our adaptation in the domain of language (Maturana & 
Varela, 1987, p. 231, original italics).  
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The logic of technologically mediated linguistic exchange is simultaneously the logic of alienation: the 
logic of thought alienated from its thinker, and value alienated from its source. Today, it is now the logic of 
identity formation and transformation; consumption and production; creation and destruction. Exchange-
value – money – has become the fundamental use-value, the abstract definition of success and social 
inclusion (Graham, 1999). Thus, it is the source of self-production and -reproduction; physical, 
psychological, and social. This should provide some clues to the trajectory of the capitalist form of society: 
it evolves by extending its processes of appropriation, alienation, and production to the most intimate 
aspects of human identity and experience, including life, thought, emotion, birth, and death (Graham, 
1999).  
The texture, creation, and constitution of knowledge ‘cannot be broached as a single process’ 
(Varela, 1992, p. 14). Rather, ‘[w]e are forced to discover regions that interweave in complex manners, 
and, in the case of humans, that extend beyond the strict confines of the body into the socio-linguistic 
register’ (p. 14). Cybersociety is the arena in which the knowledge
production are constituted, and its knowledge commodities are wholly social in their source, significance, 
and impact. 
Humans have an emergent, continually developing identity; a linguistically, socio-historically, and 
materially mediated cognitive construct. Identity is a product of socially embedded knowledge that 
recursively emerges from linguistic interactions between the human organism and its social and physical 
environments. The domain of language is also the domain in which the dialectical tension between idealism 
and materialism emerges. The current state of hypercapitalism is the evolutionary point in capitalist 
development at which alienated ‘thought becomes a commodity, and language the means of promoting that 
commodity’ (Horkheimer & Adorno 1944/1998: xi-xii). This is the perfection of capitalism, the ideal of an 
illusory system of exchange-values, the product of imagination burdened with nothing substantive, 
rigidified  into the sole source of social utility and inclusion. Under hypercapitalism, pure exchange-value 
becomes the means of identity production - self-description - for the original object of the capitalist 
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production process: the individualised human being. Marx had extrapolated this logic to its seemingly 
inevitable conclusion:  
the rule of person over person now becomes the universal rule of the thing over the 
person, the product of the producer. Just as the equivalent, value, contained the 
determination of the alienation of private property, so now we see that money is the 
sensuous, corporeal existence of that alienation (Marx, 1844/1975, p. 270). 
The most abstract and intimate social relations of hypercapitalism are the system’s primary source, means, 
and object of production. Identity is both a commodity and a by-product of the process of hypercapitalist 
production. Societies continue to disintegrate under the social pressures ‘engendered and amplified by the 
logic of competition of everyone against everyone’ (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 27). Desire for, and identification 
with commodities underpins this logic: ‘… the felt need for a thing is the most obvious, irrefutable proof 
that the thing is part of my essence, that its being is for me and that its property is the property, the peculiar 
quality peculiar to my  essence’ (Marx, 1844/1975, p. 267). Exchange-value is, today, exchangeable for 
identity. Identity is exchangeable for desire. 
The double dialectics of mythology and rationality 
Since recorded history, mythology and rationality have redounded against each other in violent, 
cyclical social upheavals, each reaching in turn for dominion over its specific domain: respectively, time 
and space (cf. Innis, 1951, chapts 2-3). Mythologies,  mostly in the form of organised religions, have 
historically sought control over the meaning of time, and thus over time itself (Innis, 1951, chapt. 2). 
Rationalities, from Pythagoras to Poincarre, have sought control over the meaning of space. Yet even the 
most astute thinkers remain confounded by the current rise in fundamentalisms and nationalisms (cf. 
Castells, 1997). But these ought not present us with any surprise whatsoever.  
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 Since mechanisation, and even moreso since electrification, societies, mythologies, and 
rationalities have collapsed into increasingly violent fluctuations between attempts to understand, define, 
and control space and time (Innis, 1951). In the seventeenth century, the literate mind found freedom from 
the constraints of time by rationalising the concept of space. In the twentieth century, the literate mind gave 
birth to the thought that would abolish theoretical distinctions between these two conceptually and 
physically contested terrains of social control. At a single stroke, Einstein spatialised time and temporalised 
space. Then, with Heisenberg’s uncertainty, God suddenly emerged from between the cracks of a 
rationality pushed to its ultimate limits. Religion, ever the adaptive appropriator and alienating force for 
intellect, embraced the new rationality precisely because of its metaphysical implications.  
 Enter the culture industry, centre stage. As space and time collapsed into the theoretical potpourri 
of quantum physics, the culture industry showed the populations of the developed world that linear reality 
and narrative myth, containing both space and time , could be alienated from its historical origins, 
mechanically reproduced, and distributed en masse. The spatial contours of the Church and Town Hall 
inevitably became anachronistic. Community became alienated from itself (this is never so ironically 
highlighted on the auspicious occasions when the terminology of “the international community” is 
invoked). The democratic process became pure entertainment, and vice versa. In the nineties, the dialectic 
of mythology, rationality, and social identity have collapsed under the illogical burden of spatialised time 
and temporalised space, reified and alienated from their original source in the knowledge economy. Today, 
this trajectory is manifested in cybersociety, hypercapitalism, and virtual reality, the holy trinity of the 
technophile’s religion. Their ideological manifestations are fundamentalisms of every type: religious, 
linguistic ethno-nationalist, economic, and political. Their social realities are unerringly repressive and 
violent. This is because the mechanisms of social control - alienated thought and value - and the conceptual 
dominions over which they rule - time and space - are conflated in the global network of new media that 
are controlled by dominant economic interests. As the dialectics of space and time, mythology and 
rationality, and speculation and illusion redound against each other at logarithmically increasing speeds, 
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they conflate alienated thought and value, rigidifying them into concrete “things” that now appear to be 
more powerful in their seemingly objective existence than at any other time in human history. 
Mythology and identity 
Since thought and language were torn asunder and apparently rendered independent of one another 
in the written word, ostensibly independent, “objective”  thought has spread through space and time, 
largely at the direction of those who control the most valued literacy of the day. These literacies – 
technologies - have been manipulated to produce, control, and reproduce particular social configurations. 
Language, though, is a different phenomenon altogether. It is a socio-biological phenomenon which is, as 
far as we know, unique to humanity and and is vastly different from writing (Maturana & Varela, 1987, p. 
231; Graham, in press; Graham and McKenna, in press). Language and thought are inseparable in terms of 
socially significant thought: the value of any particular cognitive artefact is necessarily established in 
language: ‘Language makes power; power gets valued’ (Martin, 1998, p. 429). 
By separating thought from its thinker, something that oral traditions could not do, writing formed 
the logical basis and organising principle for control by alienation. Writing is the historical source of the 
seamless trajectory that propagates “objective” thought: Consequently,  
we live existing in our language as if language were a symbolic system for referring to 
entities of different kinds that exist independently from what we do, and we treat even 
ourselves as if we existed outside language as independent entities that use language 
(Maturana, 1995).  
In short, because of millenia immersed societies controlled by sacred texts, we have come to view 
language and thought as separate things. We view language as encoded thought, no different from the 
technology of writing. To compound this illusory inversion, we have, especially since the “democratising” 
trajectory of literacy wrought by the printing press, traditionally viewed technology as the highest 
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expression of our humanity. We are, however, yet to recognise the implicit terrorism of this illusion, and so 
continue to be hypnotised by our own narcissistic gaze whenever we are exposed to the latest development 
in our technologies, which are necessarily reflections of ourselves (cf. McLuhan, 1964). For Adorno, ‘the 
primitively narcissistic aspect of identification [is] an act of devouring, of making the beloved object part of 
oneself’ (1991, p. 120, original emphasis). We identify with our technologies and they devour us. 
Trapped in the trajectory of a literate society, we continue to alienate our ideas about ourselves 
from ourselves. We continue to imagine that the products of our imagination are objective “things” which 
have an existence independent of our objective historically determined conditions. Such perceptions 
inevitably lead to speculation on the intrinsic power of our ideas, which are reflected in the forms of 
speculation that occur. Just as Xerxes, equipped with an alphabet and an army of “i
dice on Persia and lost against orality, the financial herds gamble the reified (and very real) futures of 
whole generations in the pursuit of perfect competition, namely, the type of competition in which they win, 
and in which the winner takes all. The vicious circularity of cybersociety’s knowledge economy is 
underpinned by the logic of the system upon which it is built: the alienated thoughts of the literate mind and 
the alienated value of life. 
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